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Abstract 
The paper analyses the mushrooming growth of quasi-independent public 
agencies in the public sector of post-communist states. What at first glance 
seems to be a faithful transfer of institutions from the arsenal of New Public 
Management upon closer analysis turns into a very distinct phenomenon of 
post-communist transition. In the course of  the 1990s, the amorphous public-
private mix that was the Soviet political economy became increasingly 
differentiated as ex-apparatchiki turned political entrepreneurs branched out to 
create new commercial, collective, and even quasi-state regulatory bodies. The 
dividing lines between these new forms of organization, however, often 
remained quite blurry. This problem was further exacerbated by the severe 
underfunding of executive agencies that had become a notorious problem in 
post-Soviet countries. As a result, many agencies were forced to resort to 
private and semi-private sources of funding, and to commercialize their 
activities in order to support their official operations.  
In the second decade of transition, post-Soviet governments have 
increasingly been trying to control the worst such excesses  through various 
forms of public management reform, such as the introduction of Single 
Treasury Accounts or various forms of revenue and expenditure audits. 
However, such efforts have met many setbacks and reversals; in some cases – 
such as for instance in post-Rose Revolution Georgia – the very new 
managerialist  arsenal designed to enhance cost efficiency and separation 
between policy, regulatory and services tasks have instead with the 
government’s tacit approval been used to camouflage continuing hybridization 
and ballooning public sector employment. In other cases, such as Russia’s, 
growing restrictions on one form of organization have simply stimulated a shift 
to different legal forms, in this case state unitary enterprises. 
 
Keywords 
Post-communist transition, agency reform, New Public Management, Russia, 
Georgia. 
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It Takes Two To Quango1 
Post-Soviet fiscal relations, political entrepreneurship and 
agencification from below 
1 Introduction 
Customs services run by private companies. Traffic tickets collected by private 
agencies. The Ministry of Health operating a pharmaceutical factory. A 
research institute subletting space in one of its buildings to a brothel. Real-
world examples, all of them, and all of them either current or from within the 
past fifteen years. The countries or regions in which they took place were, 
respectively, Mozambique, the United States, Turkmenistan, and the Republic 
of Georgia ((Hibou 2003; Mikesell & Mullins 2001, p. 448, The Messenger, 
October 21, 2005). As these examples show, the recent past has been 
characterized by radical transformation of public administration worldwide 
focused on privatization, service delivery, outsourcing and greater financial 
autonomy to individual government agencies, rapidly spreading from its first 
adopters among OECD countries to large parts of the developing and 
transition world. (See among others Gill 2002; Laking 2005; Schick 2002).  
Agencification has been particularly virulent in the post-Soviet world. 
Thus, just within tiny Georgia the number of officially recognized public law 
agencies rose to over 3,400 after the Rose Revolution (George et al. 2006, p. 
41-42; for a summary of the Latvian case see Pollitt 2004). But do these 
examples also demonstrate that post-communist  ministries and agencies are 
merely following a worldwide trend? Or is there a peculiarly transitional 
dynamic at work? Yes and no. Contemporary public management fashion 
known as New Public Management or  NPM in short has indeed influenced 
the course of post-communist transition, not least through the many 
administrative reform and legislative drafting projects sponsored by 
international donors and financial institutions.  
But as argued in this paper, post-communist agencification during the first 
decade of transition was largely as a home-grown phenomenon, fostered by an 
incomplete process of extrication from the old “mono-organizational” public-
private mix and largely following a bottom-up logic (albeit often with tacit to 
active encouragement by governments.)  
 In a second developmental stage, large-scale institutional transfer of 
agency forms of organizations and various forms of budgetary autonomy did 
indeed set in towards the end of the 1990s and continues until today. However, 
this has been a complex and very loosely coupled process in which outward 
conformity with international managerialist ideology has often camouflaged 
                                                
1 Thanks to William Tompson, Eugene Huskey, Don van Atta, Leonid Polishchuk, 
Peter Rutland and several others for commenting on this and earlier versions of the 
same material. A special thanks as well to Lia Sanikidze for her contributions to the 
Georgian material referred to in this paper, as well as to Richard Lax and others for 
comments on the Georgian case. 
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very different motivations on the part of both bureaucratic actors and 
governments. 
Structure of the paper: The spontaneous growth of semi-autonomous 
agencies in the first decade of transition has been closely linked to Soviet 
organizational patterns. Accordingly, Section 2 begins by examining the Soviet 
economic and budgetary system, in particular the organizational divisions 
between budget and off-budget organizations that were to acquire crucial 
significance in the post-Soviet period. Section 3 explores post-Soviet 
developments in detail, looking at both funding mechanisms and the extent 
and foundation of agency autonomy in both the immediate transition and 
consolidation periods.  Section 4 turns to the overall response and strategies of 
governments, and compares the very different use of new managerial forms in 
Russia and Georgia. 
2   The Soviet Legacy 
Post-communist transition had as one of its main tasks the creation of “public” 
and “private” actors in place of the “mono-organizational” state-cum-society 
typical of the communist system. This implied sweeping institutional changes 
all across the political economy, from the fiscal system to state-enterprise 
relations to social welfare institutions. Unsurprisingly, such a complex 
undertaking has been fraught with difficulties. Even after formal organizational 
separation, boundaries between the two spheres have remained less than clear-
cut. 
The attention both of neoliberal enthusiasts and of their critics has for the 
most part been squarely focused on the emerging “private” part of the divide. 
In designing their reform program, standard-bearers of the Washington 
consensus had above all called for “depoliticizing the economy,” (Aslund 1995) 
while largely taking for granted the logical opposite side of the equation - de-
commercializing and re-building the state as a system of universal rules and 
procedures. As the pitfalls and complexities of transition have become more 
apparent, sceptics in their turn have zeroed in on such phenomena as Russian 
“oligarchs” and their proximity to political power.  
 Yet while much post-Soviet business has retained its cosy relationship 
with the powers-that-be, relying on political influence rather than on 
competitiveness, the transition of the public sector itself has been equally 
fraught with ambiguity. Just as “commercial” entities have been slow to 
depoliticize, many executive bodies have been slow to divest themselves of 
tasks more properly performed by the private sector, retaining or expanding 
commercial activities in addition to their (old or new) administrative/regulatory 
functions. 
This process of expansion was aided by two factors. One, the conflict 
between formal and informal levels organization, which had been at the heart 
of the Soviet economy of shortage, spun out of control with the demise of the 
Party-state. Secondly, this was greatly facilitated by the fact that the supposed 
“mono-organization society” had in fact been anything but.  T.H. Rigby’s 
(1977, p. 53) original definition had been justified because “nearly all social 
activities are run by hierarchies of appointed officials under the direction of a 
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single overall command.” However, underneath this single overall command 
lay deep institutional divisions. Rather than a single form of organization 
extending across the whole of society, there were clearly separate 
organizational spheres within the command economy, often associated with 
the mode of financing (budgetary vs. self-funded or cost-accounting based). 
2.1 Formal vs. informal in the Soviet economic and 
budgetary system 
New approaches to management in the post-Soviet sphere have to contend 
with entrenched traditions. Ever since its beginnings, Soviet administrative 
doctrine fell firmly in the traditional mold. Heavily influenced by Henri Fayol’s 
views on hierarchy in organization as well as by Frederick Taylor’s “Scientific 
Management” movement, Soviet management thinking has viewed 
organizations as mechanistic entities, subject to top-down optimization. At the 
same time, the messianic potential of Taylorism found perhaps its fullest 
expression in the Soviet Union, where it contributed to the futuristic visions of 
sci-fi thinkers such as Aleksandr Bogdanov , and combined with other 
countries’ economic planning experience during World War I to lay the 
foundations for the later Soviet economic planning project (Beissinger 1988).  
The reality, of course, was rather different. As brilliantly described by 
economic historians such as Zaleski and Ellman as well as theorists such as 
Janos Kornai, actual economic reality was dominated by short term action and 
reaction, that is, by quarterly rather than annual economic plans on the one and 
day-to-day adjustments on the other hand (Kornai 1992; Zaleski 1971; Zaleski 
et al. 1980). Five year plans, so thoroughly mythologized not just in the USSR 
but among Western observers as well, were useful as mobilizational tool and – 
to use Michael Ellman’s (1989; 2007, p. 23)apt phrase – “rationality ritual,” but 
had little to do with the actual management of an economy operated by 
bargaining and informal priorities set by politics and patronage systems (on the 
political background of this development, see Lewin 1973). 
This disconnect between theory and reality was not just a feature of 
physical economic planning, but carried over into the budgetary sphere. If 
anything, it was even more visible in this area given that all through the Soviet 
period budget policy and institutions were so firmly subordinated to the 
exigencies of the planning process.2 
Soviet budgeting, in theory at least, was a very clearly top-down system. 
Gosplan and republic planning authorities were the central actors, with 
monetary flows subordinated to physical resource flows, and the budget system 
itself in a merely auxiliary role. Besides making possible monetary transactions, 
one of the main functions of the financial system from the 1930s on was to 
                                                
2 Unfortunately, Soviet public administration as such has not been covered much. 
Both then and  now, research on budgetary and expenditure issues has most often 
been either of an aggregate nature or else centered on the nature and position of 
Soviet enterprises. Executives, in contrast, were tacitly assumed to be executives 
everywhere, and thus did not merit further exploration.  
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provide an additional instrument of control over enterprises: kontrol’ rublem, 
achieved by restricting enterprises to a single, unitary bank account and strictly 
monitoring incoming and outgoing payments (Weissenburger 1983).  
As to executive agencies themselves, lower-level units were deprived of 
the chance to formulate their own, independent budgets from the bottom up. 
Instead, budget compilation was a mechanistic exercise based on given, 
externally imposed parameters: on overarching economic plans as well as on 
existing physical infrastructure levels and an intricate system of expenditure 
norms and coefficients. (Amongst the latter, the most well-known were 
probably the geographic coefficients: thus, the famous “Northern Coefficient” 
provided for higher salaries in northern, especially mining regions.  There was 
also a coefficient tied to geographical elevation, which according to local lore 
motivated the builders of the observatory complex in Georgia’s Abastumani 
mountain resort to locate some of its facilities just slightly above the elevation 
in question, thus securing the priced coefficient, and with it, higher salaries to 
all employees of the complex). 
However, if this extensive use of spending norms restricted the budget 
compilation process at lower levels, by no means did this imply a 
corresponding increase in control by higher-ranked agencies. On the contrary, 
they as well saw their scope for intervention into the budgets compiled by their 
subordinate bodies tightly restricted by the inflexibility of the process itself. As 
a result, Soviet authorities had only limited influence on the allocation of 
resources within ministries and between a ministry and its subordinate bodies. 
As Martinez-Vazquez and Boeck (2000, p. 9-10) claim in their review of 
former Soviet bloc budget systems, “(i)n contrast to modern budgeting 
techniques, expenditure requests remained essentially unscreened as they 
proceeded through the administrative chain.”  Jack Diamond (2003, p. 16) 
similarly argues in a study of the Russian case that “emphasis [in the Soviet 
accounting system] was on recording the last stage of the spending process, 
and the [Ministry of Finance] only aimed for cash control over the spending 
ministries, but not of prior stages of spending by the lower-level spending units 
(SUs),” a fact which he claims contributed significantly to the post-Soviet 
arrears crisis: “Concentrating controls on cash disbursements without 
controlling the commitments of SUs not only led to disruptions in orderly 
resource allocation within ministries but also to SUs accumulating arrears to 
the rest of the economy.” One major reason for the impotence of higher-level 
agencies was the concrete structure of Soviet budget classification, which 
grouped expenditure items by sectoral categories, rather than by specific 
agencies or programs, and thus impeded agency-level accountability (Mikesell 
& Mullins 2001, p. 445-446, 453). 
2.2 Organizational divisions in the Soviet budgetary system: 
off-budget funding 
Organizational divisions appreciably contributed to the disjuncture between 
formal and informal fiscal power. Chief among them was “the distinction 
between the government sector and the state sector” (Kraan et al. 2008, p. 16), 
which lay at the root of the many off-budget accounts that were to acquire 
huge significance in the immediate post-Soviet period. Many funds, even when 
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they formed an integral part of a specific ministry’s spending, were not part of  
the official government budget, rendering the latter largely meaningless. For 
most of Soviet history, there were no attempts to present an overall framework 
for public finances, a fact that Hutchings’ (1983, p. 16) classical study of Soviet 
budgeting does not consider an accident: 
Remaining parts of any unified financial plan which may exist at present can be 
traced only indirectly, and often with even less consistency and detail than in the 
case of the budget proper. A main reason for this may well be the different 
degree and manner of control over parts of the financial plan which are not 
included within the budget… The lack of systematic elaboration of the non-
budgetary parts of the unified financial plan cloaks that document with an extra 
veil of secrecy, as is probably the intention. 
The largest and most significant extrabudgetary funds were the large-scale 
social funds which in the majority of post-Soviet countries have persisted to 
this day.3  However, there were also all kinds of other funds affiliated with 
ministries and other agencies, often based on fee revenue, for instance from 
admission charges to cultural institutions that were directly channelled back 
into operating costs (Hutchings 1983, p. 36).   
Such extrabudgetary funds became one of the most important legacies of 
the Soviet system and will be discussed at length in the following section. Their 
immediate effete in the context of the Soviet system was to reduce both central 
control and transparency. As Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2000, p. 20-
21)summarize, “the budget accounting systems that [countries in transition] 
inherited from the planned socialist era were so fragmented that in many cases 
it proved virtually impossible to accurately determine the true size of the public 
sector.” 
Special accounts were often associated with specific organizational sub-
units of ministries and other bodies. An example of this was cited in the 
introduction regarding a case from Turkmenistan, where the Ministry of 
Health operated a pharmaceutical factory of its own (Mikesell & Mullins 2001). 
Such arrangements were far from uncommon. Their prevalence can be 
explained by several factors. On the one hand, the mixed regulatory and 
economic character of Soviet administration in itself meant that direct 
economic activity often went hand-in-hand with administrative tasks proper. 
Secondly, under the conditions of the shortage economy many ministries and 
enterprises had resorted to vertical integration in order to buffer against the 
uncertainty of supplies and – as with the many sanatoria operated by various 
state bodies – provide nonmonetary perks to their employees. In both cases, 
subunits were often set organizationally apart from their parent body, in 
                                                
3 Note that stringent usage should differentiate between extrabudgetary funds (such 
as, above all, the large social sector funds that to this day remain outside of ordinary 
government budgets) and extrabudgetary  accounts-  that is, separate individual 
accounts by ministries and agencies, many of which have survived the official shift to 
Treasury single account systems (Lorie 2003, p. 9-10). However, while the distinction 
is analytically useful, following local parlance most of the literature including most 
IMF debates continues to use the single term “extrabudgetary funds” for both. 
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particular when Soviet fiscal institutions put them under a cost-accounting 
rather than budgetary umbrella. This was especially promoted by the 1965 
economic reform; as Stephen Whitefield (1993, p. 37)explains, since that time 
“(m)inistry funds themselves must be divided into two kinds: those to cover 
the costs of the ministry apparatus itself, and to pay wages and bonuses to 
ministry employees; and those for stimulation of enterprise activity and for 
branch-level investment. In order to maintain the fiction that ministries were 
state rather than economic bodies – see the discussion below – expenditure on 
the ministry apparatus was nominally paid out of state budgets until 1986.” 
3  Public Sector Bodies In Transition 
3.1 The context: loosening control and fiscal crisis 
In summary, while lower-level units faced rigid restrictions in their operations, 
the effective absence of control by higher-level agencies coupled with the 
overall fragmentation of the system under post-communism became the 
foundation for quasi- entrepreneurial activities within post-Soviet executives. 
Bureaucratic entrepreneurship after 1991 developed according to the 
genuine meaning of path dependence. Soviet patterns did not predetermine 
post-Soviet development. Rather, existing institutions provided opportunities 
and building blocks often used in ways that could never have been anticipated 
by their original designers. New organizations in their turn frequently adopted 
existing formal as well as informal organizational patterns and strategies, as will 
be seen in the following sections. 
With the end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of rudimentary 
market principles, budget mechanisms – previously subordinated to the 
physical planning process – assumed a new and unfamiliar significance. This 
went along with a reconfiguration of economic policy institutions at the 
organizational level. The previously all-powerful Gosplan and the republic-
level planning bodies were converted into variously named Ministries of the 
Economy and divested of much of their former significance. The previously 
second-rank Finance Ministries, on the other hand, suddenly found themselves 
thrust into a much more prominent, and consequential, role. Not surprisingly, 
especially in the initial stages Finance Ministries lacked much of the necessary 
resources (human as well as technological) and organizational knowledge to 
handle the magnitude of its new tasks. As a result, control over the sub-
ministry level in particular was not significantly improved compared to before. 
Even in Latvia, “basic financial accountability was not strong, partly because 
the Ministry of Finance was not particularly powerful, and could not direct 
other ministries to follow a particular set of financial procedures for managing 
agencies” (Pollitt 2004).4 
While new budgetary management capacities were slow and difficult to 
build up, old control mechanisms had vanished along with the collapse of the 
                                                
4 For an excellent account of the respective position of Ministries of Finance in 
several Central European studies see Dimitrov et al. (2006). 
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Soviet system. This applied both to political control, embodied in the 
Communist Party hierarchy, and to the old kontrol’ rublem through the Soviet 
banking system. Volumes have been written about the downfall of the former. 
As to kontrol’ rublem, it collapsed in similar fashion; the resulting fragmentation 
and privatization of the banking system has been described exhaustively in Joel 
Hellmann’s (1993) and Juliet Johnson’s (2000) Studies. As a result, and in 
common with many political entities from the Russian Federation government 
on down, ministries and subministerial units took their business to a number 
of newly emerged “authorized banks” (upolnomochennye banki) which profited 
handsomely and paid handsomely for the privilege. The erstwhile control 
mechanism became a relationship based on mutual benefits.  
The first decade of transition, thus, loosened an already loose regime of 
control over ministries’ spending patterns. This was vastly enhanced by the 
general fiscal crisis as overall budget revenues collapsed alongside domestic 
industrial outputs. The result, on the institutional level, was a reproduction of 
the old “economics of shortage” translated to a very different setting. Thus, 
the budget process in most post-Soviet countries displayed an eerie similarity 
to erstwhile physical output planning. Just as the Five Year Plans of old, annual 
budget deliberations became an exercise in political theatre. The “real” budget, 
meanwhile, was shaped ad hoc through (rarely if ever published) quarterly or 
day-to-day revisions. Given the unrealistic and wildly inflated budget laws, 
sequestration became unavoidable. However, it usually proceeded not in 
across-the-board fixed percentage cuts but rather – just as planning 
adjustments of yore – depending on respective recipients’ political clout and 
informal (and very few formalized) priority orders. 
The consequences of this form of budget process for most ministries and 
agencies were predictable: they lost out. Pension arrears, in the game of priority 
allocations, carried much greater risk of electoral upsets and social unrest than 
state executive bodies which, if push came to shove, could always find other, 
informal ways of mobilizing necessary resources. In consequence of this 
impeccable political logic, even such powerful and consequential agencies as 
the customs authorities found themselves constantly operating under budget 
for much of the 1990s. Thus, in the first quarter of 1994 the Russian space 
industry received a miserly five percent of planned allocations (Conference to 
Discuss State of Russian Space Industry 1995), while timber producers, 
between January and September of the same year, “received no more than 66.8 
billion rubles out of an earmarked 362 billion rubles in government 
allocations” (1995). Similar figures of budget underfulfillment can be found for 
many individual agencies as an all-too-familiar litany of woes. (It should be 
cautioned, however, that many such figures have to be taken with a grain of 
salt in view of their provenance: If post-Soviet agencies claim to operate at x 
percent of needs these calculations are invariably based on traditional Soviet 
budget norms and coefficients and without any regard to actual contemporary 
functions and program targets.) 
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3.2 Seeking to survive: fee revenue and commercial 
activities 
Executive bodies responded to funding shortfalls in an entirely predictable 
way. In addition to lobbying for a higher rate of implementation of planned 
budget expenditure, they increasingly sought to access alternative sources of 
revenue such as various forms of fee income and – more rarely but no means 
infrequently – outright commercial ventures. Given post-Soviet fiscal straits 
such strategies were at least tacitly, sometimes openly condoned by 
governments - even if such practices may have contradicted deeply held 
normative convictions about the proper role of state and private spheres.  
Revenue from fees and service charges over time came to constitute a 
considerable part of ministry and/or agency income. While user fees of various 
types – such as, for instance, enterprise payments into extrabudgetary Road 
Funds – had certainly been applied in Soviet times, after the Soviet collapse 
their use skyrocketed and extended to areas that had not known them 
previously. This was true in particular of sectors such as healthcare and 
education that traditionally were provided free of charge. According to 
Mikesell & Mullins (2001), for the Central Asian countries in 2001 “(f)ormal 
and informal fees typically amount(ed) to 10 to 20 percent of total institutional 
resources for health agencies, although in one country they (were) as high as 65 
percent.”  
The introduction of fees into public administration was a deeply 
ambiguous phenomenon. On the informal end of the spectrum many “fees” 
actually amounted to bribes. Formal, seemingly innocuous forms of fees can 
likewise be viewed through different lenses. As has often been alleged by 
scholars of corruption, the sheer number of fees and required permits – for 
many of which no concrete requirements were ever publicly accessible - may 
have formed part of an overregulation strategy intended to encourage the offer 
of bribes (see for example Karklins 2002, p. 25). 
On the other hand, official fees may be an attempt to obviate the pressure 
for informal fees and bribes by introducing an element of marketization. They 
can thus be interpreted in line with such public management mantras as 
autonomy, efficiency and user and market orientation. It is clear that some 
forms of fees (along with retention of fee revenues) were newly introduced and 
encouraged by post-Soviet governments as a way to motivate and promote 
operational efficiency at the same time as ensuring ministry operation without 
committing too many scarce budget resources. This is certainly true of the 
mid-1990s incentivization scheme in which the Russians customs service was 
permitted to retain part of collected tariff payments for its own use (personal 
information from William Tompson, OECD Senior Economist.)  
Whatever the reasons, fees in all shapes flourished and pinpointing real or 
alleged sources of fee income in various agencies soon became a form of 
popular sport among the post-Soviet intelligentsia. Thus, the Georgian 
Ministry of Justice according to unsubstantiated rumours received not 
inconsiderable sums from fees charged to other agencies as payment for 
publication of executive orders in the government’s official journal 
(confidential interviews, Tbilisi 2004 and 2005.) Whether in connection with 
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this or not, certainly the ministry demonstrated an unhealthy preoccupation 
with enforcing official publication even of private copyrighted material 
normally only available for direct sale to end users, such as Georgian 
adaptations of ISO norms. 
Besides fees, executive bodies also engaged in direct commercial 
activities. Here, again, many such activities were based on practices 
established before the Soviet collapse. This was the case, for instance, with the 
Russian forest service. Under the 1997 Forest Code, funding for the forest 
service was provided out of stumpage fees. However, revenue from stumpage 
fees never amounted to much given that such fees were set at an artificially low 
level to begin with. In consequence, forest service units came to increasingly 
rely on their own, commercial sources of revenue. The possibility for such self-
financing stemmed from one of Russian forest service units’ core functions, 
that of conducting “sanitary cuttings”, or forest thinning. As their share of all 
logging grew to a staggering 20 percent, a forestry expert in the Irkutsk 
regional administration reported in 2002, “sanitary tree cutting has increased 
sevenfold since 1993… In 1998 alone, forestry officials cut down 1.5 million 
cubic meters of timber under the pretense of doing necessary cleaning cuts” 
(Moscow Times, February 15, 2000.)  As a consequence, forest service 
activities as a whole shifted focus. In some cases, regional forest management 
units came to maintain their own saw-mills, in some cases even creating 
separate commercial enterprises towards this purpose (Lesnaia promyshlennost’, 
February 1993.) As Greenpeace Russia claimed, as a result of these changes 
“the Federal Forest Service has thus been transformed from an independent 
controller of forestry to a competitor of the forestry companies, leading to 
serious problems in the control of forestry and the development of federal 
forest policy” (Lakehead University Faculty of Forestry and the Forest 
Environment 2003).  
At the other extreme are commercial activities by newly founded state 
bodies patterned after Western models, such as the diverse Georgian regulatory 
commissions. Thus, as a 2003 IMF report (2003, p. 5) charges, both the 
Georgian Railway Commission and the Communication Commission were 
“also involved in providing commercial type service for a fee (and the revenue 
is earmarked for that agency).”  
3.3 The organizational basis for hybridization:  
semi-autonomous agencies 
Commercial and fee revenue were routinely handled through separate accounts 
or sub-organizations, with the latter often a pre-requisite of the former 
(Remington 2004, p. 13). While both of these, had been part and parcel of the 
Soviet budgeting process, their mushrooming growth after 1991 would have 
been unthinkable in the old, semi-controlled environment. Thus, in early 1990s 
Central Asia “it was common to have many funds outside budgetary control. 
All tiers of government created extrabudgetary funds. … For example, in 1995-
96 ministries in the Kyrgyz Republic controlled more than 1100 extrabudgetary 
accounts or special funds… Known extrabudgetary funds in Kazakstan (sic) 
accounted for 12 percent of GDP in 1993…  In most cases, numerous special 
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funds of ministries have and, in some cases, still do exist” (Mikesell & Mullins 
2001). 
Semi-autonomous subunits, as argued in the preceding section, in many cases 
had existed within ministries and other bodies, often as part of their vertically 
integrated production and management patterns. In some cases these 
arrangements gradually became disentangled in the course of transition as 
former apparatchiki spontaneously privatized the more attractive operations 
among them; in other cases, ministries and other executive bodies held onto 
their cash cows.  
An interesting case that developed largely in parallel across many former 
Soviet republics is the rising fortune of  public but commercial protection 
police units. Based on the former Soviet “extra-departmental guard” units 
(vnevedomstvennaia okhrana) and of rather low prestige and skill (Shelley 1996, p. 
140-141), these militia subunits had traditionally been paid not from the budget 
but by enterprises themselves (Juska 2009, p. 235). After the collapse of the 
USSR, this opened the doors to a lucrative business. With private business 
growing but far from established, demand for private or quasi-private security 
services blossomed. As to public security bodies, with budget funding to the 
public sector under severe pressure, this “extra-budgetary” form of funding 
suddenly made guard units much more valuable to their ministries. As Juska 
(2009, p. 235-236) described the Lithuanian situation, “(t)he Police Protection 
Office was retained by the national police primarily for budgetary reasons, 
whereby under conditions of chronic police budget shortages and 
underfunding, the protection office was and continues to be an important 
source of supplemental revenue. What makes this income especially attractive 
to the police leadership is that, unlike budgetary allocations, it can be spent at 
their discretion.”5  However, it also created peculiar conflicts of interest, in 
particular in those cases where – as was the rule rather than the exception – 
public protection services were also charged with regulating private security 
providers (Hiscock 2006; Juska 2009). 
3.4 Corruption or coping mechanism? The political and 
normative side of hybridization 
The hybridization of post-communist public sectors is still in need of thorough 
investigation. Despite that fact, or possible because of it, normative 
assessments of this kind of development vary widely. General social sciences 
accounts, both by sociologists and political scientists, tend to view 
hybridization through the prism of corruption and patron-client relationships. 
Thus, the Polish sociologist Antoni Kaminski (1997, p. 100) pinpointed  rent-
seeking and corruption as almost exclusive motives for the formation of post-
communist agencies in Poland: “one way of obliterating the distinction 
between public and private consists in the creation of autonomous institutions, 
'foundations' or 'agencies' of unclear status, with broad prerogatives supported 
                                                
5 For detailed descriptions of the respective Russian and Ukrainian protection units 
see Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huérou 2004, p. 20; Hiscock 2006, p. 135 .  
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by administrative sanctions, and limited public accountability. The real aim of 
these institutions is to transfer public means to private individuals or 
organizations or to create funds within the public sector which can then be 
intercepted by the initiating parties.” Thomas Remington’s (2004, p. 13) 
nuanced and more politically astute analysis of Russian developments argues 
that “(a)t a time when the economic system was shifting from one based on 
the administrative control of physical resources to one in which money became 
a financial resource, off-budget funds enabled public entities to act as if they 
were private interests outside of any public accountability and to provide 
elected officials with politically useful slush funds.” In contrast, studies from 
within public finance and accounting – often elaborated in a public policy 
context – emphasize the deleterious effect of hybridization on public finance 
transparency, both in a fiscal transparency and anti-corruption perspective.  
Overall, arguments focusing on the general phenomenon of 
commercialization have tended to be much more severe in judgment than 
sectoral studies dedicated to, for example, transformation in the health or 
higher education sectors. This reflects the fact that especially in the 1990s, 
agencies often resorted to commercial activity after exhausting other sources of 
support such as direct budget payments and fee revenue - betimes (as with the 
many academic institutions subletting space to commercial ventures) out of 
sheer desperation given the severe underfunding of academia in the post-
Soviet context. In this sense, hybridization displays the same ambivalent traits 
– simultaneously fostering subversion of the system and system maintenance – 
as had the “old” late communist-era informal economy (for a brilliant example 
of this form of reasoning applied to Eastern Europe see Hankiss 1990). 
Especially in the early years, hybridization in many cases was not even 
primarily about revenues, but about the constraints created by adhering to 
specific organizational forms, in particular the right to maintain a fully 
functional commercial bank account. As a consequence, exactly as in other 
areas of post-communist transition such as, for example. The formation of 
business interest groups, choice of organizational categories became an almost 
random process in which non-profit organizations, state bodies and joint-stock 
companies at times acquired an almost interchangeable character. 
4   Governments and Agencies 
4.1 Top-down vs. bottom-up and the place of managerialist 
ideology 
As outlined in the introduction, agencification is commonly thought of as a 
top-down, technocratic process. Post-Soviet agencification clearly had very 
different origins. Built on Soviet-era institutional divisions, it thrived on a 
mixture of bureaucratic entrepreneurialism and sheer coping strategies. 
That raises the question of what, precisely, was the role of governments in 
this process? 
Certainly in the first decade of transition, given the general fiscal crisis 
there was not much choice. Governments ended up tacitly condoning 
hybridization. It was sink or swim: as governments typically were not in a 
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position to take on real control, they had little option but to grant de facto 
autonomy to agencies to use whatever means necessary in order to keep their 
organizations running. Corruption also played a role: obviously many at the top 
of the executive as well as legislative had a keen interest in arrangements that 
could benefit them personally as well as shore up their patronage networks. 
(For an excellent discussion with many details of 1990s Russian politics see 
Remington 2004, p. 13-14). 
At the same time, this grudging assent frequently remained ambivalent. 
This is even more clear of the public attitude to commercialization. Although 
space reasons do not permit a detailed analysis and documentation, it is clear 
from following post-Soviet media that the hybridization of public 
administration contradicted deeply held convictions on the proper relationship 
of public and private functions.6 And while many governments may not have 
objected to the corruption that oftentimes went hand-in-hand with 
commercialization, the public certainly did. 
This is where managerialist discourse truly came into its own. Barely 
visible in the immediate transition period, in the longer run institutional 
transfer of the NPM arsenal held out a twofold promise. One the one hand, 
the superficial similarity between NPM and post-Soviet agency formation 
offered a way to legitimate a much more messy reality. At the same time, those 
disillusioned by this reality seized on new managerialist’ promises of radical 
reform.  
These two aspects partly overlap with the two stages of agencification 
mentioned earlier. While in the first stage, agency forms of organization grew 
and adapted in a chaotic, bottom-up fashion, the second phase of public 
management transition gets much closer to an actual transfer of institutions.  
However, this process was often more about legitimacy than effective 
organizational change, and hence, went hand in hand with considerable degrees 
of loose coupling. In this final section, this will be discussed by addressing the 
different ways two post-Soviet governments – Russia and Georgia – have used 
the arsenal of New Public Management. 
4.2 Russia 
The decentralization and commercialization described above as typical of the 
first decade of transition had taken a particularly virulent form in Russia, 
leading to an extreme degree of fragmentation. As of the early 2000s, “There 
[were] 31,000 [extrabudgetary] accounts at the federal level alone in the Russian 
Federation, with own resources estimated to amount to as much as 15-20 
percent of budget expenditures” (Lorie 2003, p. 9-10). As to organizations 
themselves, in fiscal year 2000 the total number of budgetary spending units 
(including subordinate budget organizations receiving budget funding as part 
of a superior organization’s budget line) were estimated at  5,000 in the defence 
                                                
6 For the role such convictions played in the disastrous 2006 reform of the Russian 
Federal Forest Service, see Lehmbruch 2012. 
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sector and around 50,000 for the rest of the executive (Diamond 2002, p. 127-
128). 
Budget system reform 
Lack of control on the part of the Russian government, as well as pressure 
from international financial institutions which had been major donors 
throughout the 1990s prompted tightening up procedures. 
This meant for one thing giving a larger de facto role to supportive 
institutions that had already been set up in the first years of transition but so 
far had failed to make much of an impact – the Federal Treasury (in 1992) and 
the Accounts Chamber (in 1994).7  A big step towards that was the passage of 
the new Russian Budget Code in 1998. This cut down on administrative 
discretion within spending agencies by providing for audit and sanctioning 
procedures and enhancing the weight of Parliament in the budgetary process 
(Remington 2004, p. 12-13). On a technical level, it operationalized the 
Treasury system by making the treasury Single Account System mandatory, and 
explicitly abolishing the use of extrabudgetary accounts (Diamond 2002, p. 
135).  
Even considering just the Budget Code itself, tightening control came with 
some glaring gaps. Extrabudgetary accounts may have been abolished on 
paper, but this was not implemented in practice as the relevant provisions in 
the Budget Code contradicted those set up by the Civil Code  which left 
market income by federal government sub-units off-budget; perhaps 
unsurprisingly, administrative practice has followed the latter rather than the 
former(IMF 2011, p. 89). Moreover, the Budget Code restrictions on 
extrabudgetary revenue did not apply to regional and local governments, for 
whom it was estimated at 20 per cent of their total revenue (Kraan et al. 2008, 
p. 16). It also exempted the most severely underfunded sectors of the Russian 
political economy – health, culture, science and education, although from 2001 
insertions were made to annual budget laws in order to require full registration 
of all off-budget revenues (Diamond 2002, p. 135). Finally, Ministry of 
Defense organizations were also permitted to maintain extrabudgetary 
revenues (Diamond 2002, p. 135). This presumably included the infamous 
railway and construction troops maintained by , and fought about, by different 
“power ministries”: As the recent study by Brian Taylor (2011, p. 41)points 
out,  “(c)ontrol over construction troops consisting largely of draftees provides 
a ready source of ‘slave labor’ for agencies that control it, and this labor can 
easily be converted into money. The commercial value of the power ministries 
was one of the key drivers of their ‘reform’ and activity.” 
Paradoxically, tightening budget procedures raised the attractiveness of 
quasi-autonomous agencies for bureaucratic politics: While the Budget Code 
had in theory required commercial extrabudgetary revenues by federal entities 
to be integrated into the budget and the single treasury account system, this 
                                                
7 Remington (2004, p. 12) mistakenly claims that it was only the 1998 law that 
“introduced a treasury system for the first time.” 
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was not true of their subordinate agencies such as state unitary enterprises 
(Kraan et al. 2008, p. 16). 
 
Organizational reforms: the Kozak commission 
Russian proponents of administrative reform were clearly influenced by 
international managerialist models which they had identified as the solution to 
their problems. They did succeed in adopting ambitious administrative 
reorganization proposals, but as ever, implementation was the weak link. This 
was certainly true of the 2003-2004 Kozak commission which elaborated the 
2004 presidential decree 314 “On the System and Structure of Federal Organs 
of Executive Power” (see for example Golomolzin; Shevchenko 2004, p. 194; 
Timoshenko & Adhikari 2009, p. 499). At the heart of the reform was the idea 
of restructuring of public administration according to functional reviews. The 
main functional division was to be between the  public sector functions of 
rule-setting, rule enforcement and rule  implementation – to be entrusted, 
respectively, to ministries, services, and agencies (Konov). Although the actual 
government downsizing envisaged resulted in less of a bang than a whimper, 
the new classification – clearly inspired by New Public Management doctrines 
– did remain influential, and certainly has not been the last effort in this 
direction. 
In the budgetary sector, one prime aim of the 2004 reform was to reduce 
the total number of budget institutions within the new three-tier system to – 
eventually – 1,500 rather than the 40,000 in existence at the time (Diamond 
2005, p. 6). As to semi-autonomous bodies, the final goal of reformers was to 
either corporatize and later privatize them, or convert them into fully 
accountable public bodies as treasury enterprises (Tompson 2008, p. 13). 
However, rather than with a decisive solution to the problem of quasi-
autonomous agencies, Russian reformers ended up with a many-headed hydra 
of ever new organizational forms, none of which seemed to quite fulfill the 
expectations vested in it initially. With the creation of several new categories of 
public organization in the 2000s, the menu of options now included: 
- Budgetary organizations - under Civil Code article 120 an “organization 
founded by the owner to conduct administrative, cultural and social, or 
other functions of a non-commercial character and financed by it in 
whole or in a part.” (Ashmarina & Kudryashova 2011, p. 4) 
- joint stock companies in majority and sometimes minority government 
ownership, 
- “state unitary enterprises” (gosudarstevnnye unitarnye predpriiatiia), intended 
as a transitional category upon their creation (Tompson 2008, p. 13);  
- “autonomous institutions”, a newer category created originally to 
replace state unitary enterprises; however, the most recent legislation 
also envisages the forced conversion of all budgetary organizations into 
autonomous institutions which would thus become a vehicle of 
performance budgetin mechanisms(Ashmarina & Kudryashova 2011, 
p. 5). According to Kraan et al. (2008, p. 17), “(s)tate unitary enterprises 
that would opt for the legal status of autonomous institutions would 
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keep their autonomy and be allowed to undertake commercial activities 
on an extra-budgetary basis. However, these institutions would belong 
to the market sector in public finance statistics and could no longer 
engage in (quasi-)fiscal activities without being formally subsidised (on 
budget).” 
- “state corporations”, another new form of public organization intended 
primarily as a vehicle for public investment. 
 State unitary enterprises have attracted a great deal of criticism from advocates 
of public sector reform. The difference to ordinary budget establishments  was 
in accounting models; as a 2008 OECD study explains,  “(s)tate unitary 
enterprises are owned by the government but work on the basis of commercial 
accounts and commercial legislation. They are under ministerial responsibility, 
but off budget. They are auxiliary to a ministry’s activity, such as a printing 
house under the Ministry of Education or a production facility for police 
equipment under the Ministry of Justice. State unitary enterprises have a 
distinct legal status, different from regular market sector corporations. There 
are also many state unitary enterprises at the regional and local level.” (Kraan et 
al. 2008, p. 16)However, in practice the dividing lines between the two forms 
of organization often blurred; thus, many “budgetary” organizations – such as 
swimming pools and civil service canteens – were based entirely on paid 
services, while on the other hand it was not uncommon for unitary enterprises 
to operate on the basis of budget funds (Kovalevskaya 2005, p. 6). 
It is precisely this fuzziness which has made unitary enterprises attractive 
to bureaucratic actors. As William Tompson (2008, p. 13) argues, with this 
category of organization “property rights are poorly regulated and monitoring 
is weak. This has made the GUP a popular organisational form for state 
enterprise managers and bureaucrats who oversee them; GUP managers and 
the state institutions that oversee particular GUPs have often put up fierce 
resistance when attempts were made to corporatise them. Even if no 
privatisation is envisaged, corporatisation involves a degree of transparency 
and accountability that GUP insiders and their patrons in the bureaucracy 
often wish to avoid.” Unsurprising, then, that the completely elimination of 
state unitary enterprises so far has turned out a failure, although their numbers 
have indeed gone down considerably, from 11,000 unitary in 2001 to 3,765 as 
of January 2009(IMF 2011, p. 88; Кovalevskaia 2001). 
 
Performance budgeting reforms 
While the Budget Code and associated organizational reforms were intended to 
bring quasi-autonomous agencies under tighter control, the last few years have 
seen a countervailing tendency with Russia’s move towards performance 
budgeting and hence, a “more devolved system of budget management” 
(Diamond 2005, p. 9). This is a development currently still very much in 
progress, with much of the necessary legislation adopted only in the course of 
2011 or still outstanding. Under this framework,  not just state unitary 
enterprises but also “all the budgetary institutions are obliged to change their 
legal status and become one of the three types of institutions: autonomous, 
budgetary (new budgetary institutions) or government institution” (Ashmarina 
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& Kudryashova 2011, p. 7). In all three instances, they will also be subject to 
new strategic planning and monitoring mechanisms as well as functional 
reviews. 
This is ambitious in the extreme, and many questions have been raised 
about it. Even during the planning phase, IMF experts – although broadly 
supportive – had warned of the accountability and control issues implicit in the 
reform, and also of the considerable degree of state capacity required 
(Diamond 2005, p. 13-15).8 Russian accounting experts have evinced a great 
degree of skepticism on the feasibility of implementation, given the complexity 
of the required adjustment and retraining across a wide variety of public sector 
organizations (for example, see Timoshenko 2008; Timoshenko & Adhikari 
2009). 
What is perhaps even more interesting is the question why such a reform 
– ambitious even by the standards of OECD countries – is being attempted in 
the first place. This is even more curious as it contradicts the Putin-Medvedev 
era’s general trend to greater state control and ownership in the Russian 
economy - thus, Tompson (2008, p. 3-4) cites the fact that “(a)ccording to one 
recent estimate, the state-owned share of Russia’s equity market capitalisation 
rose from just 20% in mid-2003 to 35% in early 2007.”  Usual explanations of 
institutional transfer, such as IFI pressure and conditionality, plainly do not 
apply in a situation where the country last received assistance over a decade 
ago. Timoshenko and Adhikari (2009, p. 507) attempt to explain the 
development in terms of Powell and DiMaggio’s concept of normative 
isomorphism; as they argue, “the inclusion of new accounting and budgeting 
techniques into the political rhetoric, calling for better governance, 
accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness may be classified as a symbol of 
legitimacy, intended to bolster the image of the Russian state as more 
“progressive” and “modern” in the eyes of external parties and others.” If true, 
obviously this raises even more questions about the ultimate implementation 
of this very complex reform. 
4.3 The Georgian government and the agencification drive 
The Georgian public sector in the Shevardnadze period, experts as well as 
direct stakeholders agree, had become famously corrupted. Writing about the 
pre-Rose Revolution Interior Ministry, Hensell (2010)justly describes it using 
the concept of “patrimonialism as the practice of the acquisition of offices and 
material resources.” After 2003, the new Saakashvili government came in 
bearing the placard of anti-corruption reform, promising radical liberalization 
as well as a managerialist overhaul of the public sector.  
                                                
8 This cautious but supportive position is an interesting contrast to the rather different 
conclusions reached by a World Bank author team on the feasibility of NPM-style 
public management reform in Russia, given in particular the dangers inherent in 
management devolution below what the authors call the “threshold of formality” 
(Manning & Parison 2003). 
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Agencification was an integral and important part of this plan. As early as 
1999, public law agencies had been given a statutory basis as an institutional 
transfer from the German “Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts,” sajaro 
samartlis iuridiuli piri in Georgian and usually rendered from Georgian to 
English as “legal entity of public law” (LEPL.) The choice of a German 
organizational category was apparently motivated by the fact that leading 
Georgian constitutional lawyers of the Shevardnadze era had been trained in 
the German law tradition (Interviews, Tbilisi 2004-2005.)  
Little used at first, five years later public law agencies became the 
Saakashvili government’s vehicle of choice for civil service reform. At the level 
of overall administrative reform, both New Public Management in general and 
agency reform in particular formed a crucial part of the new team’s agenda. 
LEPLs were vigorously promoted by central government. The February 2004 
Law on the Structure of the Georgian Government gave them a central role 
alongside ministries, and in Article 12 specifically envisaged the transformation 
of several, hitherto department-ranked units into agencies, including in some 
cases an (often ignored) timetable but leaving most details open for further 
determination by separate government commissions. 
The agencification project did not stop at statements of intent. Over the 
next months, finance ministry officials visited different line ministries urging 
the transformation of departments into agencies, and underscoring the urgency 
of their request with alleged IMF demands – the latter promptly refuted by the 
IMF Resident Representative who upon enquiry pointed out that, in the 
Fund’s eyes, agencification posed risks to transparency (personal 
communication from Don Van Atta, Development Alternatives, Inc, Tbilisi, 
2004). As a result of this campaign (but also partly due to the conversion of 
public schools into independent agencies) the number of officially recognized 
LEPLS rose from ca 700 as of 2003 to over 3,400 after the Rose Revolution 
(George et al. 2006). 
Agencification, thus, was a project conceived with considerable zeal at the 
top and imposed campaign-style across a wide variety of public organizations. 
As it was initially rolled out, very likely the campaign may have been at least 
partly motivated by the desire to separate ministries from their cash cows. This 
conclusion is even more tempting given the persistent rumors floating around 
Tbilisi in 2005 and insisting the Ministry of Finance was considering 
consolidating all revenue-generating LEPLs into a single super-organization 
under its own roof. If this was indeed the plan, however, it was soon 
abandoned. Within the first two years of the Saakashvili government, 
reformers and ministries seemed to have reached a quiet accommodation for 
mutual benefit. 
This is illustrated by the prospering of what was certainly one of the more 
mind-boggling new public law agencies created after the Rose Revolution: the 
former Soviet extra-departmental guards units, now the (public yet 
commercial) protection police SPD (for details on the following, see 
Lehmbruch & Sanikidze, 2012 forthcoming). In accordance with the 
government’s general ideological stance, the stated intent of Georgian 
politician’s had been to privatize all or crucial parts of this notoriously corrupt 
organization. Since then, however, the protection police has instead been 
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gradually reinforcing its position, even acquiring a dual role as both regulator 
and competitor of private security services. 
Agencification played a crucial role in this development. The stunning 
reversal of stated policy intentions was made possible by re-branding the 
protection police using the arsenal of neomanagerialist reforms, in particular 
the newly introduced status of public law agency, in order to camouflage a 
form of organization very much at odds with the proclaimed direction of 
public sector reform. What resulted was not – as demanded by NPM doctrine 
– a neat separation between regulatory tasks and services, but rather a hybrid 
body, both public and commercial, competitor and regulator. Its relationship 
with its parent ministry was not so much about managerial independence and 
accountability but rather one of mutual dependence, with the protection police 
serving as a buffering mechanism providing the ministry both with financial 
support and a way to cushion the radical layoffs undertaken in the course of 
police reform. 
From the perspective of MIA, turning SPD into an agency had more  
advantages than disadvantages. On the negative side, agencification made it 
harder to maintain access to PPD’s resources, and lessened overall 
management control. But at the same time, the looser connection between 
MIA and SPD removed accusations of impropriety and simultaneously made it 
the perfect buffering mechanism for the ministry. Besides financial resources, 
this was also true with regard to employment. After the radical downsizing of 
the 2004 police reform, SPD was the largest department in the MIA structure, 
with fully 40 per cent of total staff. SPD thus cushioned the impact of the 
overall MIA cuts. Even better for MIA, SPD helped to pad police employment 
without spoiling its radical reformist image: under LEPL regulations, agency 
employees generally are not counted toward overall public sector employment 
but rather listed under services (George et al. 2006, p. 43). 
While SPD was certainly an extreme case of a post-Soviet public law 
agency, as well as unusual in the extent to which it was self-supporting, the 
general relationship between ministry and agency visible in this case mirrors 
the role of agencification for the country as a whole. From the beginning, the 
Saakashvili government has been very much bound up with its effort to project 
a poster child image of neoliberal reform. Public law agencies were a crucial 
part of this. On the one hand, the very radicalism of the initial top-down 
transformation helped to underline its – real or supposedly - radical approach 
to public management. At the same time, however, LEPLs provided crucial 
buffering opportunities, for example by hiding  the true size of the government 
payroll, but also by camouflaging budget deficits. As an IMF review revealed in 
2006, “(o)nce they have opened commercial bank accounts, LEPLs do not 
present information to the ministry of finance about their revenues or 
expenditures. Even when an LEPL has received a subsidy or transfer from the 
state budget, it is not required to report if or how those funds are spent.” 
(George et al. 2006, p. 43)This by extension also meant that international 
financial organizations, in spite of their very considerable presence in the 
country, lacked insight into the country’s true fiscal situation (personal 
information from John Zohrab, IMF Treasury Advisor, Tbilisi 2006). At the 
same time, it is difficult to assess how much control and information the 
Georgian government itself actually has on public law agencies. It is indicative, 
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for instance, that there is still no comprehensive list of LEPLs operating in the 
country. The Ministry of Finance was reportedly working on such a list as far 
back as 2006 (George et al. 2006, p. 4), however its own “Public Finance 
Management Reform Policy Vision” of 2009-2013 still places this item on the 
“to do” list (Public Finance Management Reform Policy Vision 2009, p. 10). 
4.4 The end of transition? Agencies and commercialization 
from the late 1990s until the present 
For all the superficial similarity, a close chronological look at post-Soviet 
administrative development shows clearly that modern Western management 
doctrines has only limited influence over events and generally took second 
stage both to Soviet institutional legacies and ad hoc action by officials. In 
contrast, the second round of reforms has been much more targeted and also 
more ideologically coherent. However, as of today it is still unclear just how 
much actual change they have been able to accomplish. Since the late 1990s 
nearly all post-Soviet countries have begun to tighten the systems that made 
such excesses possible. Authorized banks have been largely abolished and 
consolidated into single Treasury Accounts, audit institutions have been 
strengthened or newly introduced, the functions of different types of executive 
bodies have been more sharply delineated and finally, governments attempt to 
connect agency functions, performance, and budgets through various forms of 
medium-term expenditure reviews.  
However, many of these policies have encountered considerable problems 
during implementation. Thus, the much-vaunted creation of single Treasury 
Accounts has only gone so far. Well into the second decade of transition, even 
in EU candidate countries such as “there were instances of the holding of 
private bank accounts outside the centralised Treasury system.” (Pollitt 2004, 
p. 288). Other areas of fiscal reform similarly continue to be plagued with 
problems. 
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